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1. Introduction 
Recent scandals in the United States, such as Adelphia and the Riga family's corporate group, 
and Hollinger and Conrad Black's corporate group, have brought related party transactions under 
the spotlight. The majority of the literature addresses the value relevance of disclosing RPTs 
(e.g. Chen et al., 2009; Ge et al., 2010; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010). For example, Kohlbeck 
and Mayhew (2010) suggest that firms that disclose RPTs have significantly lower valuations 
and marginally lower subsequent returns than firms that do not make such disclosure. On the 
other hand, some studies reported that RPTs can positively affect corporate performance (e.g. 
Djankov et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2011).  
We observe that the reported results in the literature are not always clear or consistent (Cheung et 
al., 2009; Pizzo, 2013): some studies reported a positive relationship between RPTs and firm 
value (e.g. Djankov et al. 2008); other studies reported a negative relationship (e.g. Gordon et al. 
2006); and other studies reported that this relationship is conditioned upon some factors such as 
corporate governance (e.g. Chen et al., 2017; Yeh et al., 2012). For example, Chen et al., (2018) 
indicated that better corporate governance might have an effect of reducing tunneling through 
RPTs. This inconsistency regarding the influence of RPTs on firm value indicates to the need for 
more evidence. 
 
Additionally, we believe that the relationship between RPTs and firm value is context-
dependent; rather than being universal. However, it is observed that the vast majority of previous 
work focuses on U.S. and European capital markets (e.g. Aktas et al. 2008; Biesta at al. 2003; 
Del Brio et al. 2002; Fidrmuc et al. 2006; Gregory et al. 1997). This focus on developed and 
stabilized context decreases the possibility to perceive the impact of different contexts' 
specificities on the relationship between RPTs and corporate performance. For example, 
investigating high-technology firms in Taiwan and China from 1998 – 2008, Huang and Liu 
(2010) find that the accounts (notes) receivables and accounts (notes) payables from related-
parties of high-technology firms in Taiwan exhibit a significant (positive) relationship with 
performance. However, the sales or purchases of goods from related party transactions of high-
technology firms in China have a significant (negative) relationship with performance. This view 
invites us to address the impact of RPTs on firm value in different contexts, especially in 
emerging and African markets, which are rarely investigated in the literature. 
This study brings further evidence on the relationship between RPTs and firm value from a 
different context – that is, it contributes to the literature by bringing evidence from an emerging 
context: the Egyptian stock market. In particular, our study uses a sample of firms listed in the 
EGX 30 from 2012-20171. In Egypt, as Eldomiaty (2007) argued, the capital market is less 
                                                          
1 The EGX 30 Index is a free-float capitalization weighted index of the 30 most highly capitalized and liquid stocks 
traded on the Egyptian Exchange. EGX 30 constituents are reviewed and changed twice a year (end of January and 
end of July). The index was developed with a base level of 1000 as of January 1st 1998 and previously named 
CASE 30 Index. 
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efficient and suffers from higher level of information asymmetry than capital markets in 
developed countries. This context is reported to cause financing decisions to be incomplete and 
subject to a considerable degree of irregularity (Ebaid, 2009). Considering the unique 
specificities of the context, it is necessary to examine the RPTs' impact on corporate performance 
in Egypt as an example of emerging economies. 
 
Our results support studies in the literature that find no significant relationship between RPTs 
and corporate value (e.g. Kuan et al., 2010; Pozzoli and Venuti, 2014). This group of studies, so 
does ours, conclude that related party transactions and companies’ financial performance results 
are not necessarily correlated –that is, there is no evidence of a cause-effect relation between 
them. According to this perspective, the existence of such transactions does not necessarily 
means the existence of practices that undermine firms' value such as earnings management 
practices and achieving personal benefits to management on the account of business owners (see 
Gordon and Henery, 2005; Jian and Wong, 2004). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background of the study. Section 3 
presents an overview of the literature and theoretical perspectives used to explain the present 
research issue. Section 4 clarifies the research model and the sample used to conduct this 
research. Section 5 presents the findings of the study. Finally, section 6 outlines the concluding 
remarks of the study. 
2. Background 
Egypt’s stock exchange has two locations: Cairo and Alexandria. The Alexandria Stock 
Exchange was officially established in 1888, and then Cairo Stock Exchange was established in 
1903. However, they were not very active until 1940s when the Egyptian Stock Exchange ranked 
fifth in the world. Afterwards, the central planning and socialist policies adopted in Egypt in the 
mid-1950s led to a reduction in their activity, which continued until late 1980s (Rizk et al., 
2008).  
In the beginnings of the 1990s, the Egyptian government started a wide economic reform 
program, moving towards a free-market economy. Here, the processes of deregulation and 
privatization have stimulated more activity again in the stock market. The Capital Market 
Authority (CMA), which was founded in 1979, has played a part in facilitating this process 
through providing the necessary guidelines and regulations. As a result of these efforts, by the 
end of mid-2002, 1,136 companies were listed on the stock exchange compared to 656 
companies listed in 1992 (Rizk et al., 2008). Then, market capitalization grew significantly from 
L.E. 5 billion in 1990 to L.E. 815 billion in 2008 (CMA, 2008).  
The government of Egypt has recently passed legislation to impose international standard 
requirements on financial reports for all publicly-traded companies on the stock exchange. In 
particular, the Minister of Investment has issued the Ministerial Decree No. 243 in 2006 to 
incorporate the new Egyptian Accounting Standards – prepared according to international 
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accounting standards with some minor exceptions – replacing the ones issued by ministerial 
decrees numbers 503/1997 and 345/2002. The CMA is working to improve compliance with 
accounting standards. It reviews financial statements of listed companies to ensure timely and 
full compliance with the Egyptian Accounting and Auditing Standards.  
In Egypt, the primary financial-disclosure vehicle for listed companies is the annual report. 
According to the Capital Market Law No. 95 of the year 1992, all the companies listed on the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange must comply with the disclosure rules required by the law. In 
particular, they are required to provide copies of their annual and semi-annual financial 
statements to both CMA and the Egyptian Stock Exchange and to publish a summary of them in 
two daily newspapers, at least one of which must be in Arabic (Hassan et al., 2009). They are 
required to comply with Egyptian Accounting Standards, and in the absence of specific Egyptian 
standard regarding an accounting practice, international accounting standards must be applied 
(Hassan et al., 2009). Mandatory financial disclosure includes the balance sheet, the income 
statement, the cash flow statement, the statement of changes in equity, the notes to the accounts, 
the board of directors' report, and the external auditor's report. RPTs and their effects, which are 
regulated by the Egyptian accounting standard no.15, are among the voluntary information to be 
disclosed (Dahawy and Conover, 2007). 
However, it is worth indicating that, although in theory all listed companies are required to 
disclose information according to Egyptian and international accounting standards, prior studies 
on the financial-reporting practices of Egyptian listed companies have shown that 
noncompliance with disclosure requirements is the norm (see e.g. Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Dahawy 
et al., 2002; Fawzy, 2003; ROSC, 2002). This noncompliance was partially explained through 
the deep-rooted tendency towards secrecy in the Egyptian culture. Furthermore, as ROSC (2002) 
suggests, the lack of an effective enforcement policy for noncompliant companies has 
contributed to the low levels of compliance with mandatory disclosure among listed companies 
in Egypt.  
This unique context has influences on RPTs' disclosures. For example, as Dahawy et al. (2002) 
report, the Egyptian business environment does not consider insider trading to be a problematic 
issue, as corruption and insider trading transactions continue to be the norm, they argue. For 
example, Harik (1997) observed that many local people accept bribery as a way of doing 
business. Further, Dahawy and Conover (2007) reported that close family relationships and 
insider trading in the Egyptian business environment are seen as a source of stability rather than 
as representing threat to the economy. Here, exchange of information among related parties does 
not appear to the government to be an issue which should be regulated (Dahawy, 2007). Thus, it 
is interesting to address impact of RPTs on corporate performance in this particular kind of 
context.  
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3. Related party transactions: Literature review and hypothesis 
development 
A related party is a person or entity that is related to the reporting entity. For example, a related 
party can be a person who has control or joint control over the reporting entity; or a member of 
the key management personnel of the reporting entity or of a parent of the reporting entity. The 
related party relationship can also arise if: one entity and the reporting entity are members of the 
same group; both entities are joint ventures of the same third party; one entity is an associate or 
joint venture of the other entity; or one entity is a joint venture of a third entity and the other 
entity is an associate of the third entity (IAS 24). A related party transaction can be defined as a 
transfer of resources, services or obligations between a reporting entity and a related party, 
regardless of whether a price is charged (IAS 24). Related-party transactions include, for 
example, raising capital, acquiring production materials, selling firm outputs, hiring workers, 
leasing assets, purchasing and divesting assets and signing franchising contracts (Huang and Liu, 
2010).  
 
In this regard, Gordon and  Henry  (2005)  identify  several  major  types  of  RPTs,  such  as  
direct  transactions with employees or with board members, contract services or legal services 
acquired  from  management,  sales  to  (purchases  from)  related  parties  and  loans  to (from)  
related  parties. Further, Cheung et al., (2006) distinguished three categories of RPTs: 
transactions that – a priori – result in the expropriation of the firm’s minority shareholders 
(acquisition/sale of assets, commercial relations, etc.); transactions that may be to the advantage 
of the minority shareholders of the quoted company (cashing of liquid assets and relations with 
subsidiaries); and transactions that are carried out for strategic reasons and which therefore have 
no purpose of expropriation (takeover bids and alliances with equity investment, acquisitions and 
sales of shareholdings in shared subsidiaries). 
 
RPTs are sometimes referred to as insider trading. This is when corporate insiders, like managers 
or members of the supervisory board, buy or sell stocks of their own company (Wang, 2010). In 
this regard, Jian  and  Wong  (2004), for example, reported  that  RPTs of  companies  in Chinese 
group businesses are directed to their largest stockholders and these companies offer more  trade  
credits  to  their  related  parties. Likewise, Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) show that companies 
in S&P 1500 provide more loans to their directors, officers, major stockholders and affiliates. 
  
Thus, RPTs emerge when the company does business with a related or affiliated company. In 
this case, one company is in a position to influence financial decisions through its control or 
power over the other party. This suggests that RPTs can have influences on corporate value or 
performance. For example, a holding company might ask an affiliated company to decrease its 
research and development activity, or to end its relationship with another company. This issue is 
discussed in detail in Section 3.3. 
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3.1 The impact of RPTs in emerging markets 
An important portion of the literature that is concerned with the impact of RPTs is conducted in 
advanced contexts such as US and Europe. For example, Gordon et al. (2006) examined the 
relationship between RPTs and the value of companies quoted in the USA over the period 2000-
2001. Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) also investigated the value relevance of RPTs disclosure in 
the USA stock market. Nekhili and Cherif (2011) investigated the factors that influence RPTs in 
companies listed in the Paris Stock Exchange. Pozzoli and Venuti (2014) investigate the 
relationship between RPTs and financial performance of Italian listed companies.  
 
A significant portion of literature has also focused on the Asian context, specially the Chinese 
one (e.g. Ge et al., 2010; Huang and Liu, 2010; Jian and Wong, 2004; Wang and Yuan, 2012; 
Xiao and Zhao, 2012). Other scholars have also addressed the valuation of firms that disclose 
RPTs in related contexts such as Hong Kong and Singapore (Cheung et al., 2006; Chen et al., 
2018), Taiwan (Huang and Liu, 2010; Lin et al., 2010), Korea (Kang et al., 2014) and Malaysia 
(Munir and Gul, 2010). 
 
However, as indicated earlier, we believe that value relevance of RPTs is context-dependent; 
rather than being universal. This view is supported by some studies in the literature. For 
example, investigating high-technology firms in Taiwan and China from 1998 – 2008, Huang 
and Liu (2010) find that the account (notes) receivables and account (notes) payables from 
related-party transactions of high-technology firms in Taiwan exhibit a significant (positive) 
relationship with performance. On the other hand, the sales or purchases of goods from related 
party transactions of high-technology firms in China have a significant (negative) relationship 
with performance. Additionally, indicating to the role of the context in mediating the relationship 
between RPTs and firm value, Munir and Gul (2010) argue that RPTs are likely to have negative 
effects on firm performance in Malaysia because of the weak investor protection laws and the 
lack of shareholder activism in this country (See Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocky, 2003). This view explains why 
the reported results in the literature are not always clear or consistent (Cheung et al., 2009; Pizzo, 
2014). 
 
This, in turn, invites us to investigate the impact of RPTs on firm value in different settings. We 
believe that emerging economies worth more focus. In this regard, Khanna and Palepu  (2000)  
suggest  that,  in  emerging  countries  with weak institutional support to businesses, transactions 
within business groups could assist  the individual firms in the groups to operate more efficiently  
than standalone firms. For example, a firm could  obtain  financial  support from  other  firms  in  
the  same group  when  it  is  unable  to obtain them from the external capital market. Khanna 
and Palepu  (2000)  argue that the difficulties to get access to external capital market in less-
developed countries by some firms could be due to the problem  of information asymmetry 
which  would  result  in  the  market  being  unable  to  accurately  evaluate  the  firm.  Therefore, 
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related party transactions (including related party loans) between firms in the group could 
minimize this problem. Consistent with this  idea, Gopalan et al.,  (2007)  document  that   loans 
between firms in the same group are  important means of transferring cash across  group firms 
and are typically used to  financially support the weaker firms (see also Shin and Park, 1999 for 
evidence from Korea). Other studies have reported contradictory evidence from emergent 
markets. For example, Dahya et al. (2008) examined a sample of companies from countries 
where investor protection is low. They found that, in general, the companies that do not use 
RPTs have a higher value than those having recourse to such transactions: market  reaction  
studies  shows  firms  that  use  RPTs  are  associated  with  lower  market  values. These 
contradictory results exemplify how the economic value of RPTs can differ in different contexts 
– i.e. it is context-dependent. 
 
This, in turn, directs our attention to the importance of investigating RPTs in less-developed or 
emerging settings. As above, some studies have taken some steps in this regard. But we believe 
that more evidence is needed from different contexts. Unlike the highly investigated Western and 
Asian contexts in the literature, this study brings further evidence from a different and rarely 
investigated context: an African context –the Egyptian stock market. This is necessary to 
understand how the culture of special contexts like this can mediate the influence of RPTs on 
organizational performance.  
 
3.2 The impact of RPTs from a theoretical perspective 
RPTs have mainly been studied in the literature according to two different theories: conflict of 
interests and efficient transaction perspectives. Frist, according to the  conflict  of  interests 
theory,  RPTs  are noted to imply  moral  hazard  and  that they are carried  out  in  the  interest  
of  directors  in  order  to expropriate  wealth  from  shareholders.  For example, according to this 
view, RPTs imply the misuse of a company's resources and the misrepresentation of its private 
information.  
 
According to this perspective, the economic impact of RPTs on corporate performance is mainly 
explained through agency theory and the concept of tunneling. Here, RPTs are seen to arise from 
the agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This conflict is 
more apparent in emergent markets where legal protection of minority shareholders is weak. 
Here, controlling shareholders are noted to extract private benefits from minority shareholders 
through “tunneling"2 (e.g. Claessens et al. 2006; Glaeser et al. 2001; Jian and Wong, 2004; 
Johnson et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 2000). For example, Kang et al., (2014) suggest that RPTs 
occur when the agency problem is severe and they are used as a means of tunneling, thus 
                                                          
2 Johnson et al.,  (2000)  introduced  the  concept  of tunneling  as the  transfer  of  assets  and  profits  out  of firms  
for  the  benefits of those who control them.  
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destroying firm value. This is because, especially in an environment of concentrated ownership, 
the conflict of interest between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders creates a 
serious agency problem (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Lemmon and Lins, 
2003). 
 
Further, according to this perspective, related party transactions are noted to compromise 
management's agency and responsibility to shareholders or a board of director's monitoring 
function (See e.g. Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, 313) portray the agency conflict between a manager and outside shareholders as 
the manager's tendency to appropriate the firm's resources for personal consumption, like 
perquisites.  
 
As such, from this perspective, related party transactions indicate the potential for the 
expropriation of the companies' resources (Gordon et al., 2004). It is suggested here that 
managers  will  over  consume  perquisites,  for  example  by  transferring  out  some  benefits  to 
themselves,  and  this  over-consumption  damages  the  firm’s  stakeholders  (Fama  and  Jensen,  
1983; Jensen  and Meckling,  1976). In other words, managers are noted to conduct related party 
transactions with the intentions of transfer the wealth or profits of the firms to them. 
Alternatively, these transactions could be  used  to  expropriate  minority  shareholders  of  the  
firms  because  with  the  effect  of  these transactions, the minority shareholders are left with a 
smaller portion of wealth for them to claim.  
 
Here, RPTs result  in  higher  agency  costs  due  to the  alignment  of  decision-making  rights  
and  monitoring  rights (Huang and Liu, 2010). Thus, following this perspective, a significant 
portion of the literature documents a negative association between the control–ownership wedge 
and firm value suggesting that the self-serving behavior of controlling shareholders undermines 
corporate performance and thus destroys firm value (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; Joh, 
2003; Lins, 2003; Lemmon and Lins, 2003).  
 
On the other hand, as regards the efficient transaction perspective, RPTs are noted to improve 
economic efficiency by reducing transaction costs (e.g., Ryngaert and Thamas, 2007). Studies 
that support this perspective explain how RPTs can efficiently fulfill the underlying economic 
needs of the company (Gordon et al., 2004). This view considers RPTs as sound business 
exchanges fulfilling economic needs of the company (e.g. Djankov et al. 2008; Peng et al., 
2011). Unlike scholars that support the conflict of interests perspective, scholars in this camp see 
that RPTs do  not  harm  the  interests  of  shareholders  and emerge  as  efficient  contracting  
arrangements  where there  is  incomplete  information. Moreover, they report that some benefits  
will emerge out of engaging in RPTs such as: contracting  party  representatives  appointed  as  
board  members  to  facilitate  the achievement  of  better  coordination  of  the  different 
activities; getting quicker feedback  or  more  insights; obtaining deeper  reciprocal  knowledge  
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as  well  as  greater familiarity,  which  can  create  more  convenient  terms  and conditions  for  
both  parties  and  justify  transactions  that are not feasible at arm’s length; and  mitigating hold-
up problems (Huang and Liu, 2010).   
  
3.3 The implications of RPTs for corporate performance  
RPTs can have a significant impact over business transactions or business performance. Several 
studies have investigated the influence of RPTs on corporate performance or economic value. 
However, the findings regarding the real influence of RPTs on corporate performance are so far 
mix and sometimes contradictory. That is, extant academic studies provide inconsistent evidence 
regarding the effect of RPTs on firm value. 
Noticeably, a large portion of the studies notes that RPTs imply serious or negative connotations. 
This view is, in part, related to the exclusive information that insiders or related parties can have. 
Previous empirical studies on insider trading/RPTs highlight the ability of insiders to earn 
significant abnormal returns (see e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Aktas et al. 2008). Thus, RPTs 
can increase the risks that those parties obtain exclusive information to make abnormal returns 
(see also Lei and Wang, 2011). In this regard, Elhelaly (2014) and Geng (2014) indicated to the 
existence of a significant relationship between RPTs and earnings management practices 
perpetrated by majority shareholders. Gordon and Henry (2004) show that abnormal accruals are 
positively associated with RPTs. They imply that RPTs may reduce earnings quality. In this 
sense, knowing and addressing RPTs can help us evaluate a company’s performance, the risks it 
faces, and the opportunities it can get.  
Here, RPTs  are  often  viewed  as  being  inconsistent  with  shareholder  wealth  maximization. 
For example, Gordon et al., (2004) find that industry-adjusted returns are negatively associated 
with RPTs. In particular, they find a negative relationship between industry-adjusted returns and 
the number and dollar amount of loans to executives and non-executive directors, and a similar 
relationship between other types of RPTs with non-executive directors. Gordon et al. (2006) 
examined the relationship between RPTs and the value of companies quoted in the USA over the 
period 2000-2001. They find that abnormal stock market yields are negatively related to RPTs. 
They stated that RPTs  can imply  moral  hazards, and  can  be  carried  out  in  the  interest  of  
directors in order to expropriate  wealth  from  shareholders. Relatedly, Kahle and Shastri (2004) 
documented that loans to executives are made at lower than market rates, and that loans made to 
managers related to stock and option transactions are relatively inefficient in increasing 
managers’ stock ownership. Further, while examining a sample of companies from countries 
where investor protection is low, Dahya et al. (2008) found that, in general, the companies that 
do not use RPTs have a higher value than those companies that engage in this kind of 
transactions: they show  firms  that  use  RPTs  are  associated  with  lower  market  values. Chen 
et al., (2009) show that Chinese listed companies controlled by a related party engage in a higher 
the level of related party transactions, and this has a negative influence on the operational 
performance of the listed company. Lo et al. (2010) reported that related party sales distort 
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financial statements leading to greater information asymmetry and a general erosion of 
confidence in the firm. Similarly, Nekhili and Sherif (2011) show that the frequency of RPTs can 
be damaging to companies and can destroy their market value. Wang and Yuan (2012) show an  
adverse  impact of related party sales of goods and services on  the  usefulness of accounting 
earnings to investors and  on  the  quality  of  earnings  forecasts by  financial analysts (See also 
Aharony et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 2006; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010; Xiao and Zhao, 2012).  
 
As outlined earlier, this reported negative impact of RPTs on a firm's value or its financial 
performance is based on the idea that they can be used by management to achieve personal 
benefits away from the shareholders’ interests. Apart from their declared motives, RPTs are 
noted here to be exploited to the enrichment of one party at the expense of other parties that are 
not involved in the transaction. In other words, these transactions will lead to the expropriation 
of minority shareholders, to the benefit of controlling shareholders, directors or administrators. 
These latter dominating groups can make profits by selling to the firm (or buying from it), assets, 
goods or services, at prices higher (lower) than the market price (Cheng and Chen, 2006). They 
can also obtain loans on favorable terms (La Portaet al., 2003), use the firm’s assets as security 
for their personal loans, or even dilute the interest of minority shareholders by acquiring 
additional shares at preferential prices (Johnson et al., 2000). In a recent study, Bona-Sanchez et 
al., (2017) revealed  that  financial,  operating  and  investment  dimensions  of  RPTs  negatively  
affect  firm  value  due  to  the  presence  of  an  expropriation  effect  whereby RPTs  are  driven  
by  insiders’  opportunism. 
 
As explained in section 3.2, these serious effects of RPTs on firm value arise from the conflicts 
of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and that these 
transactions are carried out in the interest of controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders (Shin and Park, 1999; Chang and Hong, 2000; Johnson et al., 2000). For 
example, Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) indicated to the tendency of the owners to move profits 
from a firm where they have low cash flow rights to a firm where they have high cash flow  
rights  (Bertrand et al.,  2002)  so  that  the  controlling  owner  would have higher claim on the 
profits. Cheung et al. (2009) indicate that companies acquire assets from related parties at a 
higher price and also sell at a lower price in comparison to similar arms’ length transactions. 
Expropriation of resources could be realized through channels such as unreliable related party 
sales (Wang and Yan, 2012), abnormal accruals associated with certain types of transactions 
such as those involving fixed-rate financing from related parties (Gordon and Henery, 2005), 
extension of loan guarantees to related parties (Berkman et al., 2009), loans which have below-
market interest rates (Shastri and Khale, 2004) private securities offerings by industrial groups 
(Baek et al., 2006), excessive executive compensation (Djankov et al., 2008) and generous 
credits provided when the company has exceeding cash (Jian and Wong, 2004). 
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On the other hand, other scholars have reported a positive influence of RPTs on corporate 
financial performance: they note that RPTs can enhance corporate value. The positive influence 
of RPTs can emerge through using the company's available resource in a way that maximizes 
owners’ interests. In this regard, Djankov et al. (2008) note that no country completely bans 
RPTs, supporting the notion those RPTs, can be value enhancing. Peng et al. (2011) show how 
markets react favorably to the announcement of RPTs.   
 
Scholars representing this camp argue that RPTs can promote and preserve the company’s assets. 
And that a company can obtain better or more effective services through RPTs than the services 
they get through hiring an outsider. This is because, they argue, insiders possess an extensive 
knowledge of the firm. And this, in turn, would reduce information asymmetries and enhance 
contracting (Gordon et al., 2004). In this regard, Lei and Song (2011) showed that the size of 
internal transactions depends on the information available to internal parties before the company 
makes the necessary disclosures. And that internal parties make intensive purchases when the 
information related to revenues are positive and on the other hand, they make intensive selling 
when these information are negative. That is, these transactions are motivated by the information 
known exclusively to its parties; an issue that results in abnormal returns to them. Thus, here, 
transactions between related parties and firms are noted to involve less information asymmetry 
between the two parties, than is typically the case when the transaction occurs between the firm 
and a third-party. The resultant elimination of asymmetry of information available to 
management and stockholders would result in positive influences of RPTs on organizational 
performance (Cai et al., 2015; Cormier et al., 2009; Elbadry et al., 2015). 
 
As outlined in Section 2.2, according to the efficient transaction perspective (Gordon et al., 
2004), RPTs are considered sound business exchanges, resulting in lower dealer cost and 
economically fulfilling the needs of the firm. The proponents of this perspective see that RPTs 
can be used as efficient contracting mechanisms under incomplete information achieving 
shareholder value maximization. And this, in turn, is argued to reduce transaction costs and 
thereby achieve economies of scale (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Stein, 1997; Williamson, 1975). 
In this context, Shastri and Kahle (2004) find that executives benefit from related party loans, 
which, on average, have below-market interest rates. Chen et al., (2012) point out that RPTs are 
beneficial to mutual monitoring. And that the monitoring implied in RPTs suggests a difference 
in the agency cost.  
 
Finally, other scholars reported that the influence of RPTs on corporate value is conditioned 
upon some factors with special reference to corporate governance. For example, Ullah and Shah 
(2015) see that the independence of the board of directors has a positive influence on RPTs. On 
the other hand, ownership interests of the executives have negative influence on RPTs. Others 
reported that the negative influence of RPTs on corporate performance is mitigated with the 
existence of effective corporate governance mechanisms (Aswadi et al., 2011; Chien and Hsu, 
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2010; Rahimian and Mohammadi, 2012) –that is, the existence of governance mechanisms is 
noted to rationalize the motives behind RPTs (Yeh et al., 2012). For example, investigating 
companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange during the period 2002-2005, Nekhili and Sherif 
(2011) find that RPTs are mainly influenced by the voting rights held by the main shareholder, 
the size of the board of directors, the degree of independence enjoyed by the audit committee and 
the board of directors, the choice of external auditor, the debt ratio and the fact of being listed in 
the USA. They also find that the transactions carried out directly with the main shareholders, 
directors and/or managers have a negative influence on firm value. Investigating Korean chaebol 
(conglomerates) firms, Kang et al., (2014) find that RPTs to reduce firm value, but this value 
destruction is observed only when the control–ownership wedge is high and is more pronounced 
with the top 5 firms.  
 
As above, the literature is unclear or mixed as to whether RPTs are value destroying or value-
creating (Cheung et al., 2009; Berkman et al., 2009). In this study we seek to prove if related-
party transactions have a significant relationship with firm value through bringing evidence from 
an emergent market –the Egyptian stock market. This is done through testing the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: RPTs are not associated with the market’s valuation of firms. 
4. Research design and sample selection 
4.1 Sample selection  
Our initial sample consists of the Egyptian listed firms in the EGX 30 from 2012 to 2017. 
Therefore, the initial sample includes 180 observations: 12 observations, which were related to 
financial institutions, were excluded. The final number of observations, after excluding 13 
missing observations, is 152 (Table 1). 
Table 1: Sample Size 
    Number of Firm Year Observations 
Initial Sample  180 
Less Financial firms  12 
Less Missing observations  16 
Final number of observation  152 
 
4.2 Research model and variables measurement 
The following model is used to test the research hypothesis.  
LOGMVit = α + βit RPT + βit LOGTA + βit CAXTA + βit BV + βit LEV + βit ROA+ Industry 
FE + Year FE 
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 (Equation) 
 
The above model is designed to test the valuation of firms that make related party transactions 
disclosure. LOGMV is the logarithm of market value of common equity. Consistent with 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010), RPTs is defined here as a dummy variable coded as one if the 
firm disclosed RPTs; otherwise, it is coded as zero. Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) suggested the 
use of an indicator variable to represent firms that engage in RPTs instead of attempting to 
investigate the dollar value of the firm’s RPTs for practical reasons. They find that not all RPTs 
disclosures provide detailed disclosure about monetary implications of RPTs and even in cases 
where monetary amounts are disclosed, it is not clear which amounts are most relevant – asset, 
liability, equity or income aspects of the transactions, and the amounts disclosed across 
transactions are inconsistent (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010). Further, consistent with Allgood 
and Farrell (2003), we use return on assets (ROA) as a measure of firm value.   
Our study controls for a set of factors related to firm value (Size, Leverage, Profitability, Capital 
Expenditures). We also control for the time and year effect using industry and year dummies. To 
identify firm industry, we use the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. Table 2 below 
provides summary of variable measurements. 
 
Table 2: Variables measurement  
Variables Definitions 
LOGMV The logarithm of market value of common 
equity 
RPT A dummy variable coded as one if the firm 
disclosed RPT; otherwise, it is coded as 
zero. 
LOGTA The natural logarithm of total assets 
CAXTA The ratio of capital expenditure to total 
assets 
LOGBV the logarithm of book value of common 
equity 
ROA The operating income divide by total assets 
LEV The total debt divided by total assets 
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5. Results and analysis  
5.1 Descriptive analysis  
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. It shows that the average value of market 
value (MV) is 6800 in millions. It also shows that the average return on assets of the sample is 
4.3% and the average Leverage is 32%. In addition, Table 3 indicates that the Egyptian firms 
tend to spend less on capital expenditure. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics suggest that 
around 60 % of firms provide information about related parties, which is relatively high 
compared to the existing literature. 
Table 3: Descriptive statics of all variables   
Variables Mean Median MAX MIN SD 
MV(millions) 6800 5400 36000 673 6000 
LOGMV 8.48 8.59 10.5 6.51 0.852 
RPT 0.606 1 1 0 0.49 
LOGTA 16 15.7 18.4 13.8 1.13 
CAXTA 0.034 0.012 0.51 1.60E-04 0.06 
LOGBV 14.6 14.7 17.2 10.5 1.35 
LEV 32.1 20.5 115 0 33.7 
ROA 0.043 0.031 0.373 -0.176 0.091 
 
As shown in Table 4, the correlation matrix suggests that there is a negative relationship between 
RPTs and market value, but this relationship is insignificant. It also suggests that none of the 
coefficients are above 80% which in turn suggests the absence of a multicollinearity problem 
(Field, 2013). 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix among all variables  
 
  LOGMV RPT LOTA CAXTA BV LEV ROA 
  
      
  
LOGMV 1 
     
  
RPT 0.1185 1 
    
  
LOGTA 0.47*** 0.5179*** 1 
   
  
CAXTA 0.1988*** 0.1451* 0.0961 1 
  
  
LOGBV 0.4769*** 0.3645*** 0.7298*** 0.127 1 
 
  
LEV -0.035 0.4834*** 0.3961*** 0.1597** 0.0313 1   
ROA 0.2695*** -0.2988*** -0.3329*** -0.0217 -0.0648 -0.4148*** 1 
 
With regard to our control variables, as Table 4 reports, profitability (ROA), size (LOGTA) and 
Capital expenditure (CAXTA) are positively associated with firm value (See e.g. Eisenberg, 
1998; Mehran, 1995). In contrast, the Leverage coefficient (LEV) is found to be insignificant.  
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5.2 Main results 
As outlined above, the main objective of this study is to examine the valuation of firms that engage in 
RPTs. The OLS regression results are reported in Table 5. The main variable of interest, RPTs disclosure, 
is defined as an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the firm disclosed information about RPTs 
regardless of the monetary value. Consistent with expectations, our findings suggest that RPTs are not 
associated with the market’s valuation of firms. As shown in Table 5, the coefficient of RPTs is not 
significant. 
Table 5: The impact of RPTs on Firm value  
 
LOGMV Coef. T value 
RPT -0.105 -0.798 
LOGTA 0.401 5.477 
CAXTA 0.745 0.851 
LOGBV 0.096 1.672 
LEV 4.593 6.594 
ROA 0.001 0.66 
Constant 0.402 0.483 
Observations 152 
R-squared 
 
0.44 
Industry  Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
 
As regards the dual effect of RPTs, it is sometimes difficult to determine if transactions are 
beneficial or detrimental to company performance. This study finds no evidence of positive 
impact of the existence of RPTs (cf. Djankov et al.,, 2008; Peng et al., 2011) as well as negative 
effects stemming from RPTs (cf. Elhelaly, 2014; Gordon and Henry, 2004). This finding is 
consistent with Kuan et al. (2010), for example, who do not find evidence of a relationship 
between RPTs and earnings management as a practice that undermines corporate value (see also 
Pozzoli and Venuti, 2014). Supporting this idea, Huang and Liu (2010), while investigating high-
technology firms in Taiwan and China from 1998 – 2008, find that the account (notes) 
receivables and account (notes) payables from related-party transactions of high-technology 
firms in Taiwan exhibit a significant (positive) relationship with performance. However, the 
sales or purchases of goods from related party transactions of high-technology firms in China 
have a significant (negative) relationship with performance. These studies, so does ours, 
conclude that related party transactions and firms' market value are not correlated and that there 
is no evidence of a cause-effect relationship between them. Hence, according to this perspective, 
the existence of such transactions does not necessarily means the existence of earnings 
management practices or the tendency to achieve personal benefits to management on the 
account of business owners i.e. practices that undermine firm value. 
The reported different finding in this work assures the intermediary role of the context and the 
local culture in the relationship between RPTs and firm value. This is the contrast to taking a 
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universal perspective of the impact of RPTs such as the negative view that is mostly reported in 
the literature. For example, the different finding of this study can be ascribed to the instability of 
the Egyptian context due to the latest intense political events which broke out at the beginnings 
of 2011 (see Ahmed et al., 2017; Elmassri et al., 2016); an issue which needs particular 
investigation. 
Finally, unlike expectations and the literature, which suggests that Egyptian companies disregard 
RPTs disclosures (Dahawy and Covoner, 2007; Harik, 1997), we found that 60 % of investigated 
firms provide information about related parties, which is relatively high compared to the existing 
literature. This indicates to the positive impact of the latest rules and regulations regarding RPTs 
imposed the concerned regulatory authorities such as CMA and the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
(Section 2). 
6. Conclusion 
This study brings further evidence from an emerging African context –Egypt – on the impact of 
RPTs on corporate value, in contrast to the highly investigated Western and Asian contexts. To 
the knowledge of our mind there is no study that investigates the value relevance of RPTs in an 
African context. 
As regards the effect of RPTs, it is sometimes difficult to determine if transactions are beneficial 
or detrimental to company performance. Generally speaking, the reported results in the literature 
are not always clear or consistent. That is, previous studies reported conflicting results 
concerning the relationship between RPTs and firm value.  (Cheung et al., 2009; Pizzo, 2013). 
This work extends pervious research by investigating the impact of RPTs on Egyptian firms' 
market value as measured by ROA. 
In contrast to studies that reported negative influences of RPTs (e.g. Nekhili and Sherif, 2011; 
Wang and Yuan, 2012) or studies that reported a positive impact of RPTs (e.g. Peng et al., 2011; 
Shastri and Kahle, 2004); the present work finds insignificant relationship between RPTs and 
firm value. This result is consistent with Kuan et al. (2010) and Pozzoli and Venuti (2014) who 
find no evidence of cause-and-effect relationship between RPTs and better corporate 
performance. This different result suggests that, especially in emerging markets, the existence of 
RPTs is not necessarily associated with practices that undermine or enhance firm value. This 
different finding can be attributed to the nature of the Egyptian market as an emerging market 
and unstable one due to the emergence of the latest political uprisings in the country since the 
beginning of 2011, an issue which investigation in future research.  
 
This indicates to the role of the context in explaining the relationship between organizational 
practices and corporate performance. Hence this study stresses the idea that the valuation of 
firms that engage in RPTs is context-dependent; rather than being universal. This view echoes 
the idea that it is necessary to examine the impact of RPTs in other nations, because different 
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nations can have different cultural and political environments and industry characteristics which 
can have its implications for RPTs. This invites us to critically investigate the implications of the 
recent volatile political changes in the country for the relationship between RPTs and valuation 
of firms, which can be the subject of a future study.  
  
In particular, considering the latest political events in Egypt, we believe that a study is needed 
which investigates the intermediary impact of the political uprisings at the state level on the 
relationship between RPTs and corporate financial performance. This will require extending the 
period of investigation to also include some years before the start of the latest revolutions in 
Egypt which broke out in January 2011, i.e. there should be two periods of investigation before 
2011 and after 2011. This is necessary to capture the real impact of political risk on corporate 
practices and performance, especially on the value relevance of RPTs.  
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